The Australian Federal Police (AFP) charged Russian-Australian dual citizen Vladimir Teslov, 27, on August 21, 2026, with one count of attempting to engage in intentional foreign interference. Brisbane Magistrates Court in Australia adjourned the matter until October 2. Teslov has not been convicted, and the 20-year maximum penalty is not a sentence already imposed.

Police allege Teslov joined Ukraine’s armed forces to collect information about military personnel, units and locations, then provided or attempted to provide it to people he believed were acting for Russian intelligence services. The AFP said the alleged conduct created a risk to Ukrainian military personnel but that investigators had found no indication of a threat to Australia.

Police allege a timeline across three countries

The AFP alleges Teslov traveled to Russia in October 2024 for military-style training and returned to Australia in December. Investigators say he remained in contact with people he believed were connected to Russian intelligence services. They allege he traveled to Ukraine in May 2025, joined its armed forces and gained access to operational information.

Australia’s Counter Foreign Interference Task Force opened Operation Woodcreeper in June 2026 after an extensive investigation by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO). Officers executed five search warrants in and around Brisbane and seized electronic devices and other items for forensic examination. AFP Commissioner Krissy Barrett said investigators had not established whether Teslov worked with associates in Australia and that further arrests were possible.

What the foreign-interference charge requires

Section 92.2(1) of Australia’s Criminal Code applies when conduct is carried out on behalf of or in collaboration with a foreign principal, or is directed, funded or supervised by one. The person must intend one of four listed outcomes, including support for the principal’s intelligence activities, and some part of the conduct must be covert, involve deception, threaten serious harm or involve a demand with menaces. Supporting a foreign principal’s intelligence activities is a separate statutory route from prejudicing Australia’s national security. Section 92.6 gives offenses in this division extended geographical jurisdiction, while the AFP alleges that parts of Teslov’s conduct occurred in Australia and overseas.

Section 11.1 says an attempt must go beyond conduct that is merely preparatory and is punishable as if the attempted offense had been completed. Section 92.2(1) sets a 20-year maximum, which therefore also applies to the attempted offense alleged in this case. A statutory maximum does not predict the sentence a court would impose after a conviction.

The police release identifies the statutory provisions but does not present the prosecution evidence for each element. APPI News could not find a publicly available charge sheet or prosecution filing with those details as of August 23, 2026. The case is legally distinct from David McBride’s convictions for taking and unlawfully communicating Australian military information, which did not involve a foreign-interference charge.

Evidence and possible associates remain unresolved

The AFP says devices and other seized items still require extensive forensic examination. Its public account does not identify the military material at issue or distinguish information allegedly transmitted from information covered only by an alleged attempt. Police have also not said whether any other person will be charged.

The Russian Embassy in Canberra told ABC News that it learned of the case from media reports and had received no official request or notification from Australian authorities or Teslov. APPI News could not independently verify communications between the embassy, Australian authorities and the accused.